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Abstract

This paper is designed to offer an overview of the major events and policy issues
related to Arts 81, 82 and 86 EC in the last year. The paper follows the format of
previous years and is divided into three sections: — A general overview of major
events (legislation and notices, European Court cases and European Commission
decisions). — Anoutlineofcurrent policy issues, including legal privilege, private
actions and Art.82 guidelines. — Discussion of certain areas of specific interest, notably competition and the liberal professions, energy, sport and media and
certain international issues.
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Brussels

This paper is designed to offer an overview of the
major events and policy issues related to Arts 81, 82
and 86 EC in the last year.
The paper follows the format of previous years
and is divided into three sections:
— A general overview of major events (legislation and notices, European Court cases and
European Commission decisions).
— An outline of current policy issues, including
legal privilege, private actions and Art.82
guidelines.
— Discussion of certain areas of specific interest, notably competition and the liberal professions, energy, sport and media and certain
international issues.
Legislation and European court judgments are
included in Part 1. The other sections will be
included in Part 2, published in the next journal.

Box 1
 Major Themes in 2004
— Enlargement: 10 new Member States
* With modernisation and decentralisation
 No notifications/no immunity
 Shared Art.81(3) EC
 Now: Art.9 commitments and lapsed
notification cases?
— Basics litigation
* Still litigating what is an agreement
* Still litigating what the privilege against
self-incrimination means
* Still litigating what legal privilege is
* BUT also highly complex Art.82 issues
 E.g. compulsory licensing of IP
— Competition advocacy and the liberal
professions

* With many thanks to Ingrid Cloosterin and Flavia Distefano
for their general help in the production of this paper and



In the author’s view there have been three major
themes this year.
The primary theme of the year in competition
terms was the combination of Enlargement, modernisation and centralisation, turning around the
focal point of May 1, 2004. On that day, 10 countries
joined the EU, bringing a scale change and new
systems of competition enforcement. The notifications system stopped. The ‘‘European Competition network’’ started. National courts were also
given the right to apply Art.81(3) EC. The Transfer
of Technology Block Exemption entered into force,1
with market share ceilings and related Guidelines,
completing the modernisation of Art.81 EC legislation.
Already, there have been developments with
Regulation 1/2003, notably planned ‘‘Article 9’’ commitment decisions2 and proceedings against previously notified practices, no longer covered by
immunity. Companies and their lawyers are thinking about ‘‘self-assessment’’ rather than ‘‘To notify
or not to notify?’’!
The second theme of the year has been ‘‘basics
litigation’’: In Volkswagen II and Bayer Adalat, on
the question as to what is an agreement; in Graphite
Electrodes and Austrian Banks, questions as to
what material a company has to give the Commission in response to a request for information; and in
Akzo Nobel questions as to what legal professional
privilege covers. It is true that there are complex
issues also, such as when, exceptionally, dominant
companies may have to license their IP as in IMS,
but it is striking to see basic issues like this coming
up again, issues which should perhaps be clear by
now.
The third theme has been the Commission’s
drive into the liberal professions. It appears that
the Commission wants to push far fast. The Commission has started with a case involving Belgian
Architects and a ‘‘Communication’’ urging selfreview by the professions. It will be interesting to
see how the issues develop or whether (like, for
example, sport or air transport) matters will take a
while to clarify and sort out.

Elisabeth Arsenidou for her drafting assistance in various
sections. This is a slightly revised version of a presentation
given at the IBC Advanced Competition Law Conference,
Brussels, November 2004. The reference period is from
November 2003 until October 2004. The paper does not
cover merger control.
1. See, generally Commission Press Releases IP/04/511,
April 21, 2004; IP/04/411, March 30, 2004.
2. Commitment decisions; MEMO/04/217, September
17, 2004.
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that evidence of infringement is likely to be
there.

Overview of major events
Legislative developments (adopted and
proposed)

— New Transfer of Technology Block
Exemption
* Key new distinctions/limits
* Related ‘‘IP Guidelines’’
* N.B. 4 technologies ‘‘de minimis’’ rule

At the same time, a new procedural regulation
entered into force, Commission Regulation 773/
2004.6 In the Spring of 2004, the Commission also
finalised and adopted various notices on: Effect
on trade; Art.81(3) EC; co-operation amongst the
Commission and NCAs; co-operation amongst the
Commission, NCAs and national courts; informal
guidance on novel questions; and the handling of
complaints.7
These documents were summarised in detail last
year as drafts.8 Some have changed a little, but
generally they are much the same. (Key points are
noted below.)

— Extension of EC procedural framework in air
transport to third country routes
* Finally!

Enlargement
Enlargement involves four key changes.

Box 2
 Legislation/Notices
— Regulation 1/2003 and the related
decentralisation package
* N.B. Leniency provisions
* A narrowing of Art.81(1) EC?

— N.B. New draft revised Access to File Notice
just published

—

Adopted
May 1, 2004: Overview
On May 1, 2004, there were huge changes to the way
in which EC Competition law is enforced. Four
aspects apply to general competition, the fifth is a
new EC Merger Regulation with a new substantive
test, not covered in this paper3:
—

—

—

—

First, the new Enlargement, with 10 new EU
Member States.4 This is probably the most
important change, because it results in a
scale change in the size of the EU, which
moves from 15 to 25 Member States and a
much wider geographic scope for EC Competition law.
Secondly, the modernising features of
Council Regulation 1/2003.5 These came
into force on May 1, 2004. Above all with
the abolition of notifications to the European Commission (‘‘the Commission’’) for
clearance of agreements.
Thirdly, the decentralisation aspects of
Council Regulation 1/2003. Above all, the
shared enforcement of the whole of Art.81
EC with national competition authorities
(‘‘NCAs’’) and national courts, meaning that
they can also apply Art.81(3) EC, as well as
the Commission.
Fourthly, the new investigatory powers of
Regulation 1/2003. Above all, the new right
for the Commission to inspect private homes,
as well as company premises, if it is shown

3. See, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Guide
to EC Merger Regulation (4th ed., September 2004).
4. Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic.
5. [2003] O.J. L1/1.



—

—

—

First, the new NCAs join in the new ‘‘European Competition Network’’ (‘‘ECN’’) of
competition authorities, sharing enforcement of the EC rules with the European
Commission (as well as enforcing their
own national rules).
Secondly, since May 1, 2004, the Commission is able to intervene directly in the 10
new Member States, with inspections on
company premises and new, controversial
powers to carry out such inspections in
private homes.9
Thirdly, there should be more focus on
restrictions on trade and competition (i)
among the 10 new Member States and (ii)
between the 10 new Member States and the
15 old EU Member States. Previously, competition enforcement in or with these countries was a question for national laws or EC
law and the Europe Agreements. Direct application of relevant EC rules is likely to be
more direct and focussed on cross-border
restrictions.
Fourthly, in the new Member States, we
expect an enforcement drive on (i) ‘‘15 old
Member State companies’’ (who arguably
should know better) and (ii) also on former
monopolies and oligopolies that came about
through privatisation and still hold dominant positions.

Modernisation
This has been going on for some time. Seven points
may be noted now.
6. [2004] O.J. L123/18.
7. All are conveniently grouped in [2004] O.J. C101 and
are otherwise available on the Commission’s website. See,
also Gauer, Kjølbye, Dalheimer, De Smijter, Schnichels
and Laurila, EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter (Summer 2004), pp.1–6.
8. [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 25–32.
9. Art.21 of Council Regulation 1/2003.
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—

—

—

—

First, the Commission has sought to focus on
restrictions on competition by those with
market power, involving more significant
effects, with a greater emphasis on economic assessments than previously. In practice, that has meant vertical and horizontal
block exemptions with market share ceilings and related guidelines, setting a review
framework for situations where companies
have market power and are not covered by
the block exemption’s ‘‘safe harbours’’.
Secondly, the Commission has also modernised its legislation to fit a system with no
notifications for ‘‘exemption’’ since, from May
2004, this was abolished. In practice, this
means that companies and their advisers
now cannot notify to obtain immunity
from fines, if there is a perceived risk that
an arrangement could be viewed so unfavourably as to justify them. There is still a possibility to obtain guidance from the Commission
on cases involving novel questions, but this
is intended to be of limited application,
for ‘‘genuinely unresolved’’ questions. The
Commission has also removed ‘‘grey-listed’’
(possibly unlawful) clauses from block exemptions and the related ‘‘opposition procedures’’ for tacit approval of notified
agreements.
Thirdly, although the focus on economic
assessments is generally welcome, it has
been at a price in terms of legal certainty.
Notably, the introduction of market share
ceilings on block exemptions means that
there may often be more insecurity for companies. For example, if the relevant market
for supply of a product is European, then
one approach can be taken for Europe as a
whole. If, on the other hand, there are national or regional markets with variations in
market positions and market power, then
corresponding variations may be required to
the agreements to reflect these factual variations. Probably this should be welcomed
insofar as it may lead to more precise, correct
factual assessments, but it will make simple
co-ordination of ‘‘European’’ wide trading
positions difficult in many cases.
Fourthly, there will also be more insecurity
insofar as there will not be exemptions for a
given period of time. This concern can be
exaggerated, insofar as there were only few
actual exemption decisions and a great deal
of private practice has been about moving
companies into broadly acceptable positions, with some risk of challenge but
good arguments in defence, rather than notifying. That has not changed. Nevertheless,
a clear issue is how time will be treated in EC
competition rulings before NCAs and



—

—

—

courts. It is no longer a question of a forward
looking prediction for a period, justifying
‘‘exemption’’. It is more of a ‘‘snapshot’’ as to
whether, at a given moment, a restriction is
anti-competitive. It will be interesting to see
if this will lead to different results in future
rulings. It also remains to be seen for how
long clearance decisions will be effective,
given the risk that plaintiffs may seek their
review and may not be clearly prevented
from doing so, as with a formal exemption
decision.
Fifthly, it should be emphasised that the
process of modernisation is also not over.
This year we saw the third general area to be
covered, with modernisation of the Transfer
of Technology Block Exemption. However,
there have also been discussions as to modernising Art.82 EC enforcement, with draft
guidelines to come, it is suggested next year.
Related to this, the Commission has indicated in its Transfer Technology Guidelines
and Notice on Art.81(3) EC that dominant
companies may have more scope to benefit
from Art.81(3) EC, provided that the practice in question is not abusive.10 This may
well mean that the Vertical Restraints and
Horizontal Guidelines will need related revision, since they both generally treat dominance, not abuse as the limit for Art.81(3)
application.11
Sixthly, since May 2004, the Commission
appears to have started proceedings against
various practices which had been notified
previously and whose fine immunity lapsed
with the entry into force of Regulation 1/
2003, changing the situation hugely for
those involved. (Some of these are described
below.)
Finally, the numerous new rules and
‘‘guidelines’’ will have to be tested to see
how they work in practice. Phrases in the
now numerous guidelines are useful, but no
substitute for actual cases.

Decentralisation
There are also a few points on decentralisation
which merit special mention.
First, special thought has been devoted to shared
enforcement and the varying leniency programmes
in most but not all EU Member States.
This has resulted in special undertakings by
NCAs that information submitted by leniency applicants will not be passed on to another authority,
without the consent of the leniency applicant,
10. [2004] O.J. C102/2, para.151; [2004] O.J. C101/97,
para.106.
11. See the Vertical Guidelines, [2000] O.J. C291/1, paras
153, 211 and 222; Horizontal Guidelines, [2001] O.J. C3/2,
para.36.
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unless either the applicant has also applied for
leniency in the same case before the receiving
authority or the receiving authority has given a
specific commitment not to use the information
transmitted to impose sanctions on the leniency
applicant or on its staff.12 The Commission has
also indicated in the Notice on co-operation with
national courts that it will not transmit to a national
court information voluntarily submitted by a leniency applicant without the consent of that applicant.13
Otherwise, because of the risk that a cartel case
may be passed to different enforcing authorities one
may note that multiple applications for leniency (at
NCA and Commission level) may often still be
advisable.
Secondly, it will be recalled that there is a rebuttable presumption that trade between Member
States is not capable of being affected when the
aggregate annual EU turnover of the companies
concerned does not exceed e40 million and the
aggregate market share of the parties on any relevant market within the EU affected by the agreement does not exceed 5 per cent.14
Thirdly, there has been a fair amount of discussion about the Art.81(3) EC Notice. Notably, it
is argued that the Notice has narrowed the scope of
application of Art.81(1) EC while making the
Art.81(3) EC ‘‘exception’’ very demanding.
What is new for a Commission text is the statement that some market power is required for
Art.81(1) EC to apply. We have always talked about
the ‘‘appreciability’’ of restrictions. Now the Commission is going beyond ‘‘de minimis’’ effect concepts to say that, where effect is the basis for
infringing Art.81(1) EC, some consumer impact
and/or market power must be shown:
‘‘For an agreement to be restrictive by effect it must
affect actual or potential competition to such an extent
that on the relevant market negative effects on prices,
output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods
and services can be expected with a reasonable degree
of probability’’.15

This is welcome insofar as one would think it is
right to focus resources on the more important
cases. What is troublesome, however, is that this
may not be an easy line to define in practice.16 The
Commission says that all this simply reflects the
modern view that both plaintiffs and regulators and
defendants must have real evidence to substantiate
their claims that Art.81(1) EC is infringed, or that
12. Paras 39–42 of the ‘‘Notice on Co-operation between
Competition Authorities’’; see also, Blake and Schnichels,
EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter (Summer
2004), pp.7–13.
13. Para.26 of the ‘‘Notice on Co-operation with National
Courts’’.
14. Para.52 of the ‘‘Notice on Effect on Trade’’.
15. Paras 24–27 of the ‘‘Notice on Art.81(3) EC’’.
16. See also Kjølbye, ‘‘The New Commission Guidelines
on the Application of Article 81(1)’’ [2004] E.C.L.R. 566.



Art.81(3) EC is met. If so, this is welcome, but it is
true that, as drafted, the Art.81(3) EC Notice portrays that provision as the ‘‘exception’’ rather than a
rule often met.
Fourthly, it is clear that the advice which practitioners are giving has already changed. Until now
the tendency has been to assess closely the enforcement practice of the Commission in a certain field.
Such assessments are now much more difficult,
insofar as the test is whether any competition
authority or court dealing with the case would
find an infringement or would be likely to apply
Art.81(3) EC. Practitioners therefore have to give a
more general and, perhaps, more objective assessment than previously.
Fifthly, the Commission will still be key on the
big issues. For the ‘‘Art.10’’ declaratory decisions
(which only it can take and which are specifically
designed to clarify the position on certain types of
new or important practice17) and also because of the
principles confirmed in the European Court of
Justice (‘‘ECJ’’) Masterfoods judgment.18 It will be
recalled that this judgment requires that national
authorities and courts do not take decisions that
run counter to a Commission decision or are likely
to run counter to a Commission decision in proceedings on the same issue or matter. NCA decisions
also still have to be co-ordinated with the Commission and other authorities. If a NCA were not to
follow agreed EC Competition law, the Commission
could still decide to take over a case19 so, to that extent
also, Brussels still has a special role to play.
Sixthly, there are some important points to note
on work-sharing. Since May 1, 2004, a competition
case can be dealt with by a NCA or the Commission
in Brussels or handled by several NCAs or before a
national court.
According to the principles of work-sharing, a
‘‘material link’’ between the infringement and the
enforcing authority or authorities is required. It will
be recalled that the key principles are that an
authority is considered ‘‘well-placed’’ to deal with
a case if (i) the behaviour of the parties has substantial effects for the territory in which the authority is
based; (ii) the authority can effectively gather all
relevant information; and (iii) the authority can
effectively bring the infringement to an end.20
We expect those cases with their main competitive impact in a single Member State to be dealt
with by the ‘‘local’’ NCA, since it should be best
placed to deal with the case, unless a special principle or precedent is involved, in which case the
matter may be dealt with by the Commission. On
the other hand, if three or more EU Member States
17. Art.10 and recital (14) of Council Regulation 1/2003.
18. Case C–344/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-11369, available on
the European Court of Justice website.
19. See Art.11(6) of Council Regulation 1/2003.
20. Paras 8–9 of the ‘‘Notice on Co-operation between
Competition Authorities’’.
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are affected by a restriction, we expect the case to be
handled in Brussels. In between, there may be joint
action by NCAs or action by one NCA.
This may become a developing area. For example, it may be of interest to note that the Nordic
competition authorities often appear to co-operate
together and have signed an official agreement on
such procedures. It may be that, in the years to
come, interventions by other combinations of authorities, for example, the Spanish and Portuguese,
or the Austrian, Czech and Slovak authorities
should be expected.
In practice, one may also expect the Commission
to pass cases to NCAs more willingly, unless it is
thought that they may not be dealt with for lack of
resources or other factors. The Commission could
do this before, notably invoking Automec II,21 but
now it has even more incentive to do so, because it
can leave the actual case to others and still be
involved through the ECN.
Finally, it is emphasised that in applying EC
Competition law the national authorities will follow their national procedural rules, which may
involve important distinctions. For example, on
recognition of legal professional privilege, which
may be different where national rules apply to EC
competition enforcement. Thus, in Portugal, it is
argued that in-house counsel, who are still members of the Portuguese Bar, have such privilege.
There are also variations in national practice on
the privilege against self-incrimination.
The TTBE and related guidelines
The new Transfer of Technology Block Exemption
(‘‘TTBE’’) Commission Regulation 772/2004 and
related guidelines (the ‘‘Transfer Technology’’ or
‘‘IP’’ Guidelines) were adopted on April 7, 2004 and
entered into force on May 1, 2004.22
The main principles are as follows:

technology or product market, then again
the benefit of the BE cannot be claimed.
Critically therefore some market assessment must
now be made. Different ‘‘black-lists’’ for unacceptable provisions apply (so-called ‘‘hardcore’’ provisions). Whether companies are competitors is
assessed at the time the agreement is entered into
and, importantly, that status is retained even if they
subsequently become competitors, unless there are
substantial amendments to the agreement later.
Secondly, the BE applies to software copyright
licensing, but not generally to licensing of rights in
performances and other copyright, and not to trademarks. Licences must be for production of contract
products, not just resale, and licences must be
between two parties. The BE is also applicable to
sub-licensing and sub-contracting provided that
the primary purpose of the licence remains the
production of contract products.23 Settlement and
non-assertion agreements are now normally covered by the BE.24
Thirdly, restrictions on a licensee using severable improvements and/or requiring their exclusive licensing or assignment to the licensor and nochallenge clauses are excluded from the BE. (It may
be useful to recall that including ‘‘hardcore’’ provisions in an agreement means that the whole
agreement falls outside the BE. An ‘‘excluded’’
provision just falls outside the BE to be assessed
individually.)
Fourthly, the hardcore restrictions list has been
revised as between the draft and the final TTBE.
—

Transfer of Technology Block Exemption
First, the new TTBE reflects two key changes in
comparison to the old one: (i) a distinction is made
between competitors and non-competitors and
(ii) the Block Exemption (‘‘BE’’) is only available
up to certain market share ceilings. Thus,
—

—

If an agreement involves competitors which
together have more than 20 per cent of the
relevant technology or product market then
the agreement cannot benefit from the BE.
If an agreement involves non-competitors
either of which on its own has more than
30 per cent market share on the relevant

21. Case T–24/90, Automec v Commission [1992] E.C.R.
II-2223.
22. [2004] O.J. L123/11 and [2004] O.J. C101/2. IP/04/
470, April 7, 2004. With thanks to Cormac O’Daly for his
assistance with this section. See also [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 22.



—

—

—

For competitors, the main black-listed provisions are: maximum and minimum pricefixing, reciprocal output limitations, certain
market-sharing provisions and restrictions
on a licensee’s ability to exploit its own
technology or pursue its own separate
R&D. The BE is stricter for reciprocal than
non-reciprocal agreements between competitors. Non-reciprocal output restrictions
between competitors are now covered by the
BE.
In the case of non-competitors, the main
hardcore restrictions are: minimum resale
price maintenance, certain passive sales
and restrictions on sales where a licensee
is in a selective distribution system.
The TTBE allows active sales bans on licensor and/or licensee, as well as customer
and territorial restrictions on the licensor.
It is noteworthy that, between non-competitors, you can restrict passive sales into
the territory or customer group of another
licensee during the first two years in which

23. See the IP Guidelines, paras 42 and 44.
24. See the IP Guidelines, paras 43 and 204–209.
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the licensee is selling contract products in
that territory.25
Fifthly, new licences have to comply with these
rules already. Existing licences have to be brought
into line by March 31, 2006 or fall to be considered
under the general rules, not benefiting from the BE.

—

—

Transfer Technology Guidelines
These Guidelines are extensive. They explain the
general application of Art.81(1) EC to licensing and
the position of the TTBE in comparison to other BEs
(such as Joint R&D and Vertical Restraints). They
include comment on the TTBE itself and focus on
certain types of agreement, considering the position if they are not covered by the TTBE.
Some of the more important general points are as
follows:
—

—

—

—

—

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Outside the area of hardcore restrictions,
Art.81 EC is considered unlikely to be infringed where there are four or more independently controlled, commercially viable,
substitutable technologies on the relevant
market, in addition to those controlled by
the parties to the licensing agreement.26
Market shares in technology markets are
calculated for the purpose of the TTBE by
reference to sales of products incorporating
the licensed technology.27
On a technology market, the parties are
considered to be actual competitors, if the
licensee is already licensing competing technology, apparently irrespective of where.28
Potential competition on the technology
market is not taken into account for the
application of the BE.29 However, potential
competition may be relevant when assessing an agreement which falls outside the
BE.30
If the parties’ own technologies are in a
blocking position vis-à-vis another technology, the parties are considered to be noncompetitors on the technology market. The
Commission clearly will be critical before
accepting such a claim.31
If a licensed technology represents such a
major (or breakthrough) innovation that the
technology of the licensee becomes obsolete
or uncompetitive, then licensor and licensee may not be considered competitors.32

Art.4(2)(b)(ii) TTBE.
Para.131.
Para.23.
Para.28.
Para.30.
Para.66.
Para.32.
Para.33.

—

The buyer power of the purchaser of licensed products is taken into account in
assessing whether the parties to the licence
have market power (in individual assessment cases).33
The Commission appears open to economic
arguments on the application of Art.81(1)
and (3) EC: ‘‘Article 81 cannot be applied
without considering the ex ante investments and the risks related thereto. The
risk facing the parties and the sunk investment that must be committed to implement
the agreement can thus lead to the agreement falling outside Article 81(1) EC or
fulfilling the conditions of Article 81(3)
EC, as the case may be, for the period of
time required to recoup the investment’’.34
As noted above, the Commission refers to
the limits of Art.81(3) EC clearance as ‘‘precluding any application of the exception
rule to restrictive agreements that constitute
an abuse of a dominant position’’35 (emphasis added). Therefore, the fact that an agreement is concluded by a dominant firm does
not in itself act as a bar to exemption.

Thereafter the Commission discusses various specific obligations/restrictions:










Royalties
Exclusive licensing and sales restrictions
Output restrictions
Field of use restrictions
Captive use restrictions
Tying and bundling
Non-compete obligations
Settlement and non-assertion agreements
Technology pools

Running through this part of the Guidelines is
the theme that a licensor is not expected to create
direct competition to himself. There is also a general sliding scale of concern: reciprocal agreements
between competitors are treated most cautiously
(fearing that they amount to simple market-sharing);
then non-reciprocal agreements between competitors; and then agreements between non-competitors.
The following points are of particular interest,
where an agreement is not covered by the BE.
Generally, so-called ‘‘running royalties’’ (meaning royalties based on product sales) are considered
to be a normal form of revenue collection.
However, in a limited number of cases, royalty
obligations between competitors may be viewed as
price-fixing, e.g. where competitors cross-license
and provide for reciprocal running royalties and
it is considered that the licence is devoid of a

33. Para.137.
34. Para.147.
35. Para.151.
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pro-competitive purpose.36 In addition, the Commission considers that calculating royalties on the
basis of all licensee sales, regardless of whether the
licensed technology is being used, is a hardcore
restriction deterring a licensee from using his own
technology.37
With respect to exclusive licensing between
competitors, outside the TTBE, the Commission
will examine the competitive significance of the
licensor. Where the licensor is only competing on
the technology market and is, for example, a small
research institute, there is unlikely to be an infringement of Art.81(1) EC.38 Exclusive licensing
to non-competitors is viewed favourably. It may not
fall within Art.81(1) EC at all. If it does, the Commission states that it will generally fulfil the conditions of Art.81(3) EC. It is acknowledged that
exclusivity may be required in order to induce
investment by a licensee.39 However, it is said that
intervention may be warranted where a dominant
licensee obtains an exclusive licence and entry into
the technology market is difficult.40
Above the BE market share ceiling non-reciprocal
sales restrictions between competitors may be
within Art.81(1) EC, if either licensor or licensee
has market power. However, such restrictions may
be indispensable to protect other licensees’ investments.41 Outside the BE, sales restrictions imposed
between non-competitors are still viewed favourably. Restrictions on a licensee may fall outside
Art.81(1) EC, if without the restrictions, the licensing would not occur. A technology owner is also not
expected to create competition with himself, so
restrictions on a licensor are likely to fulfil the conditions of Art.81(3) EC.42 Between licensees, while
restrictions on active sales may fulfil Art.81(3) EC,
the Commission considers that Art.81(3) EC is
unlikely to apply to restrictions on passive sales
exceeding the two year period provided for in
Art.4(2)(b).43
Non-reciprocal output restrictions between competitors can now come within the BE. The favourable approach continues outside the BE, as Art.81(3)
EC is said to be likely to apply, at least where the
licensor’s technology is substantially better than
the licensee’s and the output restriction substantially exceeds the licensee’s output prior to the
agreement.44 The argument is that such restrictions
may be required as an incentive for the licensor to
grant the licence in the first place.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Paras 80 and 157.
Para.157.
Para.164.
Para.165.
Para.166.
Paras 170 and 171.
Paras 172 and 173.
Para.174.
Para.175.

On field of use restrictions, the Commission
emphasises that the parties have to define their
fields of use objectively by reference to ‘‘identified
and meaningful characteristics of the licensed product’’ or they risk a finding that the restriction
constitutes a customer restriction.45 Reciprocal
field of use clauses between competitors, when
combined with exclusive or sole territories, are
considered to be hardcore restrictions.46 There is
also some caution with regard to cross-licensing
between competitors, where an agreement provides for asymmetrical field of use restrictions,
i.e. where one party is permitted to use the technology within one product market or technical field
and the other is permitted to use it within a different
product market or field of use.47
Complex as this all is, it is a huge improvement
on the old TTBE. However, clearly the introduction
of market share ceilings creates new uncertainties.
We still do not know a lot about how the Commission will deal with situations involving market
power.48 In addition, there is much work to do
now, seeing if existing licences need revision or
termination, given changes under the new rules.
Air transport between the EU and third countries
In February 2004, the EU Council adopted Council
Regulation 411/2004, giving the European Commission a procedural framework to review airline
transactions which have an impact on routes between the EU and third countries.49 No more complex, direct reliance on the EC Treaty and complex
co-operation with national authorities for intervention in Airline Alliance cases (although presumably such co-operation will continue, but now
under the general ‘‘ECN’’ framework). Previously
the Commission had to rely on (what is now) Art.85
EC, (the former Art.89 EC), which was cumbersome
and did not confer on the Commission the power to
impose remedies.50
The change appears to have come about mainly
because of the ECJ’s judgment in the ‘‘Open Skies’’
cases in 2002,51 which established that Member
States acted illegally when they entered into agreements with the United States on a number of issues
where the Community has exclusive competence.
It also fits in with the new spirit of ECN enforcement, especially as the Airline Alliance cases
patently have broad EU implications.

45. Para.180.
46. Para.181.
47. Para.183.
48. See also Monti: ‘‘The new EU Policy on Technology
Transfer Agreements’’, SPEECH/04/19, January 16, 2004.
49. IP/04/272, February 26, 2004; [2004] O.J. L68/1.
50. See, e.g. [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 93–94.
51. See, e.g. Case C–466/98 Commission v United Kingdom [2002] E.C.R. I-9427. (There were several cases.)
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Proposed
Market access to port services
In October 2004, the Commission adopted a new
proposal for a Directive on Market Access to Port
Services, which would introduce specific rules on
access to port services and aiming at the creation of
a level playing field in competition between ports.52
The proposal addresses two main issues: (a) intraport competition (competition between providers
of the same port service within a port) and (b) interport competition (competition between ports).
The Directive applies to ports with 1.5 million
tonnes and/or 200,000 passengers per year. The
services concerned are pilotage, towage, mooring
cargo and passenger handling.
As regards intra-port competition, authorisations for service providers are mandatory and a
system for providing authorisations is established.
The Directive requires objective, transparent and
non-discriminatory criteria for granting authorisations, which should be relevant, proportional and
public.
The method used for granting the authorisation
determines what will happen in the event of a later
limitation in the number of service providers of a
port service. Thus, when such a limitation arises,
authorisations which have been granted through
a selection procedure must remain unchanged,
whereas authorisations which have been granted
without a selection procedure are to be terminated
and reconsidered with a selection procedure. Compensation is foreseen for the existing service provider for past, not fully amortised investments, if he
does not win the selection procedure. As regards
pilotage, authorisations may be subject to criteria
related to public service obligations and maritime
safety. Self-handling should be allowed subject to
an authorisation, granted in an efficient and expedient manner and remain in force for as long as
the self-handler complies with the criteria for granting it.
As regards inter-port competition, the managing
body of the port is required to have transparent
accounting. The Financial Transparency Directive
is considered applicable to all ports covered by the
proposed Directive. State Aid guidelines are to be
adopted by the Commission within a year after the
adoption of the Directive.
Access to file
In October 2004, the Commission published a Communication inviting comments on a draft Access to
File Notice to replace the previous one from 1997.53
The draft takes into account (amongst other things)

52. IP/04/1212, October 13, 2004.
53. [2004] O.J. C259/8. For the current notice, see [1997]
O.J. C23/3.



Regulation 1/2003 and recent case law such as the
CFI Cement judgment.
The following are the main points of interest for
general enforcement (not focussing on separate
merger control issues):
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

The Commission continues with the position that access to file is a right of defence
and therefore can only be asserted after a
Statement of Objections.54 (This is a point of
continued controversy where many argue
that principles of fairness and good administration should allow earlier access, at least
for the parties.)
Importantly for cartel leniency cases, where
minutes are taken and agreed by the undertaking in question, they may be accessible
after deletion of any business secrets or
other confidential information (and may be
evidence relied on in the case).55
Most documents passing within the ECN
will not be accessible. However, documents
emanating from Member States, the EFTA
Surveillance Authority or EFTA States may
be disclosed where they contain allegations
brought against a party that the Commission
must examine, or that form part of the evidence in the investigative process, similar to
documents from private parties.56
Material may be withheld, if its disclosure
would significantly harm a person or undertaking. This may be used to protect anonymous complainants or third parties where
retaliation is feared.57 (It is, however, a right
which defendants dislike because they fear
they are missing part of the case against
them.)
The Commission states that it generally presumes that turnover, sales, market-share
and similar data which is more than five
years old is no longer confidential.58
The draft notice underlines that even confidential information may have to be disclosed
if it is necessary to prove an infringement or
to exonerate a party.59
The draft Notice states that in Art.81 and 82
cases, access will be granted ‘‘on one single
occasion’’. Generally, no access is given
to replies of other parties to Statements of
Objections, although further access may be
necessary if documents received after the
issue of the Statement of Objections constitute new evidence against a party.60

Paras 1 and 3.
Para.12.
Para.15.
Para.18.
Para.22.
Para.23.
Para.26.
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—

—

Complainants do not have the same rights of
access as parties, but may be given access to
documents on which the Commission has
based its provisional assessment if they
contest the Commission’s rejection of a complaint.61
There are procedures for appeals on confidentiality issues to the Hearing Officer.

Finally and importantly again for (plaintiff) cartel
cases, the Commission underlines that access is
only for the purposes of its administrative proceedings. If documents are used otherwise and counsel
are involved, the Commission may complain to
national bars.62 This is a big issue since the sanction
appears weak and one may also think that the focus
should be on the party, not the lawyer. Apparently
in the Austrian Banks cartel case, a political party
was admitted as a third party to the proceedings and
made the non-confidential Statement of Objections
public despite an instruction from the Hearing
Officer not to do so!63
Liner shipping conferences
In October 2004, the Commission adopted a ‘‘White
Paper’’ aiming to bring more competition to the
maritime sector.64 The Commission suggested modifying or repealing the existing Council Regulation
4056/86 on the application of Arts 81 and 82 EC to
maritime transport, or replacing it with other instruments, such as guidelines.
It will be recalled that shipping companies
have traditionally organised themselves as liner
conferences, whereby they would agree common
or uniform freight rates in order to provide regular
scheduled maritime transport services to shippers
and freight forwarders. The 1986 Regulation contains rules which exempt price-fixing, capacity
regulation and other agreements or consultation
between liner shipping companies from Arts 81
and 82 EC. The justification for these exemptions
has been the view that the rate-setting and other
activities of liner conferences lead to stable freight
rates, allowing shippers to offer reliable scheduled
maritime transport services. As noted last year, the
Commission is campaigning for modernisation,
repealing these exemptions.65

61. Para.30.
62. Para.47.
63. [2004] O.J. C48/7.
64. IP/04/1213, October 13, 2004.
65. The Commission also issued a consultation paper
concerning Commission Regulation 1617/93, relating to
IATA Consultations on Passenger Tariffs on Scheduled Air
Services and Slot Allocation to Airports in June 2004; the
text is available on the Commission’s website.



European Court cases (ECJ and CFI)
Box 3


Main European Court Cases
— Article 82 EC
* BA Virgin—Classic fidelity rebates
judgment (again)
* IMS—Compulsory licensing
(exceptionally)
* Syfait
 A.G. Jacobs’ opinion
 Suggests that it is not abusive for a
pharmaceutical supplier to withhold a
product to prevent parallel trade, in the
current exceptional circumstances
— What is an agreement?
* Volkswagen/Bayer Adalat
* Exhortations not enough
* Continuous commercial relations not
enough
* Specific acquiescence to the particular
unlawful conduct required

Article 82 EC cases
BA Virgin
In December 2003, the Court of First Instance
(‘‘CFI’’) upheld the Commission’s decision in BA/
Virgin.66 British Airways (‘‘BA’’) had appealed
against the Commission’s decision that it had
abused its dominant position as a purchaser of UK
air travel agency services, by applying a growth
bonus. The Commission fined BA e6.8 million.
There has been much discussion about the judgment (as Michelin II67), mainly because dominant
companies would like to be allowed to use incentive bonuses and see them as ‘‘normal competition’’.
BA had agreements with travel agents in the
United Kingdom in order to sell tickets there. Until
1997, BA applied two flat rate commissions: 9 per
cent for international tickets and 7.5 per cent for
domestic tickets. In addition, BA applied various
financial incentives, including a performance bonus,
calculated by reference to the growth of sales of BA
tickets from one financial year to another.
Subsequently, after a complaint by Virgin and
a Commission procedure, in 1998 BA adopted a
different system of performance bonuses based on a
new, lower basic commission rate of 7 per cent on
all tickets sold (irrespective of destination), with
an extra commission of up to 3 per cent on international tickets and 1 per cent on domestic tickets
for growth in sales. Growth was measured against
the corresponding month in the previous year.
Bonuses applied not only to the growth element,

66. Case T–219/99, judgment of December 17, 2003.
67. Case T–203/01, judgment of September 30, 2003.
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but also to all sales of BA tickets during the reference period in question.
On a second complaint by Virgin, the Commission found that BA had infringed Art.82 EC. BA was
considered a dominant purchaser of travel agency
services for distributing tickets in the United Kingdom. The Commission found essentially two abusive aspects in BA’s performance bonus system:
—

—

There was discrimination insofar as BA’s
reward scheme could entail the application
of different commission rates to an identical
amount of revenue, because the rate of increase in sales of BA tickets could differ
from one agency to another.
The system was loyalty inducing, because it
restricted agents’ freedom to supply their
services to other airlines, without the system being based on any economically justified consideration.

The CFI agreed. Several points may be noted.
First, the Court found that it made no difference
that BA was a dominant purchaser (as opposed to a
seller) of services. Article 82 EC applies equally to
companies in a dominant position in relation to
their suppliers and those in the same position as
regards their customers.68
Secondly, the Court found that it did not matter
that BA might not be dominant in the transport
markets affected by its conduct on the agency
services market. Quoting Commercial Solvents,69
the Court stated that an abuse committed on a
dominated product market, the effects of which
are felt in a separate market on which the company
concerned does not hold a dominant position, may
fall within Art.82 EC, provided that the separate
market is closely connected to the first.70 This was
the case here.
Thirdly, BA was found to be in a dominant
position despite a fall of some 6 per cent in its share
of air ticket sales handled by members of the largest
UK travel association in the previous four years.
The Court noted that BA still had almost 40 per
cent, a multiple of its nearest rivals (such as Virgin
on 5.5 per cent) and still had a ‘‘very largely preponderant share’’ of the agents’ business. Moreover,
BA offered more routes and frequencies from the
United Kingdom than its rivals, so it was an obligatory business partner for travel agents there. The
Court also considered that the way that BA had
reduced the flat rate commission to introduce its
new combined flat rate and performance based
system was indicative of market power.71
Fourthly, the Court upheld the Commission’s
position on discrimination.72
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

[101].
Joined Cases 6 and 7–73, [1974] E.C.R. 223.
[127].
[217]–[219] and [224].
[234]–[240].



Fifthly, the Court repeated what has now become
the classic explanation of the fidelity rebate rules.73
Dominant companies have a special responsibility
not to distort competition. A dominant company
may defend its commercial interests, but not with
behaviour whose purpose is to strengthen that
dominant position.
A system of rebates whose effect is to prevent
customers from obtaining supplies from market
competitors is considered abusive for a dominant
company. Quantity rebate schemes linked to efficiencies and economies of scale which result in
lower tariffs to customers are lawful, but, where
such positive effects are not proved, an unlawful
‘‘fidelity-building’’ effect may be inferred. Actual
exclusionary effects do not have to be shown, if it is
clear that the conduct concerned is capable of
having, or likely to have, such an effect.74
Sixthly, on the facts the Court found that BA’s
system was ‘‘fidelity-building’’. The Court noted
that the system gave greatly increasing rewards to
travel agents for increased sales and disproportionate reductions in the rate of performance reward if
an agent’s sales of BA tickets fell. The Court agreed
with the Commission that BA’s rivals could not
attain a ‘‘level of revenue capable of constituting a
sufficiently broad financial base to allow them
effectively to establish a reward scheme similar to
BA’s in order to counter the exclusionary effect of
that scheme’’.75
To the extent that BA granted additional commission on all tickets sold, rather than on just the
tickets sold once a sales target was reached, the
Court also found that there was no objective economic justification for the scheme. As such, BA was
found to have had ‘‘no interest’’ in applying the
scheme other than ousting rival airlines.76 The likelihood of exclusionary effects had also been shown,
given that 85 per cent of all air tickets in the United
Kingdom were sold through agents, which generally had to do business with BA. Nor was it necessary to show damage to consumers, if there was
objective detriment to the structure of competition
itself 77 (relying on Continental Can78).
Finally, the Court rejected BA’s argument that it
had a legitimate interest in the rebate scheme (other
than ousting rivals). BA argued that the incentive
scheme should be accepted: (i) because it was impossible to calculate the precise cost savings involved in particular ticket supply; and (ii) because,
given the air transport industry’s high fixed costs,
improvements in capacity utilisation yielded lower
average unit costs, which BA is entitled to share
with agents and customers. The Court would not
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

[241]–[249].
[293].
[278].
[288].
[311].
Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215.
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accept this. It noted the lack of precise correlation
between the amount of benefit from increased seat
occupancy and the amount of performance bonus
to the agent. It even considered that the amount of
increased rewards payable to agents might exceed
the profits to BA from the higher occupancy rate.79
Interestingly, this was not the same chamber
of the CFI as in Michelin II. Within a few months
therefore, the CFI has confirmed its orthodox position on fidelity rebates twice in clear terms. Given
that modernisation of Art.82 EC was already in the
air, it may be thought that the CFI wished to point
out clearly that it does not wish these specific rules
to change.
In practical terms, after Michelin and BA/Virgin,
it is confirmed that dominant companies should
generally avoid performance bonuses based on
individualised growth, payable retrospectively on
all sales achieved. However, one may think that
standard scales of increased rewards, backed by
reasonably precise, proven economic justifications
and payment of rebate just on additional sales after
a given scale step, should be lawful. That will not
allow dominant companies to do everything their
smaller competitors can (which will remain controversial), but it will allow companies to give some
incentives for increased performance.
It may be thought somewhat harsh of the Court to
have found no legitimate interest on the part of BA
in the scheme. Part of BA’s aim appears to have been
to reduce a large ‘‘flat rate’’ commission approach
and replace it with a more performance based
system, which may well be laudable in competitive
terms. Unfortunately, as so often happens in these
cases, certain additional, arguably non-essential,
features of a bonus scheme may affect its whole
characterisation and mean that it is condemned
rather than upheld. The key for the dominant undertaking is to see whether they actually need those
extra features, given their market strength.
IMS
In April 2004, the ECJ gave its judgment in a
preliminary ruling concerning the IMS Health/NDC
Health case.80 We have noted the parallel European
Commission and Court proceedings before.81
The case arose because IMS Health (‘‘IMS’’) developed a way of gathering information on pharmaceutical sales and prescriptions in Germany, using
a matrix for classification of the information, called
a ‘‘brick’’ structure. This structure involves some
1860 ‘‘bricks’’ or units, on the basis of which IMS
Health had been selling regional data to pharmaceutical companies. There was evidence (although
also some dispute) about the extent to which the

79. [289]–[290].
80. Case C–418/01, judgment of April 29, 2004.
81. See [2002] I.C.C.L.R. 64–65.



customers for this information had helped IMS to
develop the structure. IMS claimed copyright in it
(a position confirmed in German courts).
A former employee of IMS started to offer competing services based on a different classification
structure, but with little success because customers
argued that the data had to follow the ‘‘1860’’
structure (or other structures based on it) to be
comparable with earlier studies and because it
was the accepted structure. In those circumstances,
NDC (which had acquired the former employee’s
business) argued that the brick structure was a de
facto legal standard and that IMS should be obliged
to license it to NDC, or else it would eliminate all
competition.
The Commission agreed with NDC in these exceptional circumstances and ordered interim measures. However, the CFI subsequently suspended
such measures, pending the determination of the
main proceedings, mainly for reasons related to the
balance of convenience. Later the Commission then
withdrew its order on the basis of lack of urgency.
In parallel, IMS had sued for breach of copyright
and an injunction to stop NDC using its brick
structure, by proceedings before the Frankfurt
Landgericht.
Importantly, the referring court found that IMS
had distributed its ‘‘brick structures’’ free of charge
to pharmacies and doctors’ surgeries, which had
helped the structures to become the normal industry standard to which its clients adapted their
information and distribution systems. The Court
then made a reference to the ECJ, considering that,
if there were an abuse of dominant position, IMS
would have to license. There were essentially three
questions:
(1) Was it abusive to refuse a copyright licence
where the licensee seeks access to the same
market on which the owner of the copyright
has a dominant position?
(2) Is it relevant that the owner had involved
customers in creating the databank protected
by copyright?
(3) Is it relevant to consider the ‘‘material outlay/
costs’’ which clients would incur if they were
to go over to a competitor, when considering
the abusive conduct of the copyright owner.
The ECJ’s answers were essentially ‘‘yes’’ to questions 2 and 3 and ‘‘it depends’’ to question 1.
The Court looked first at whether access to the
brick structure was ‘‘indispensable’’ and in the
process considered questions 2 and 3. Applying
Bronner,82 the Court held that, for a product or
service to be indispensable, it had to be established
at least that the creation of competing products or
services was not economically viable on a scale
82. Case C–7/97, Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint [1998]
E.C.R. I-7791.
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comparable to that of the undertaking which controlled the existing product or service. If it were
proven that the pharmaceutical companies had
participated in developing the 1860 brick structure,
that may have created a user dependency on that
structure at a technical level. If so, that would be
relevant. Equally, in such circumstances, it would
be likely that customers would have to make exceptional ‘‘organisational and financial’’ efforts in
order to acquire regional sales studies based on
another structure. That might force the rival supplier to offer the rival products on such terms that it
would not be economically viable on a scale comparable to IMS. That might make the brick structure
indispensable to market access, a question which
the national court had to assess on the facts.
Turning then to question 1, the Court was faced
with argument as to whether the Magill criteria for
compulsory licensing were met. The Court summarised that case and stated that for Magill to apply
it had to be shown that: (i) the refusal to license was
preventing the emergence of a new product for
which there was potential consumer demand;
(ii) such refusal was unjustified; and (iii) the
refusal would exclude any competition on a secondary market.
The Commission argued that it was not necessary for the refusal to be on a separate market to that
in which competition was denied. It simply had to
relate to a ‘‘stage of upstream production’’.
The Court’s view appears to be that there must be
two markets, but then suggested ways in which it
may be easy to infer the upstream market. Notably,
the fact that an upstream product or service (such as
the delivery service in Bronner) is not marketed
separately, does not mean that a separate upstream
market does not exist, if such a potential or hypothetical market can be identified.
However, then the Court focussed on whether
the refusal to license prevented the emergence of
a new product. The Court noted: ‘‘in the balancing
of the interest in protection of copyright and the
economic freedom of its owner, against the interest
in protection of free competition, the latter can
prevail only where refusal to grant a licence prevents the development of the secondary market to
the detriment of consumers’’83 (emphasis added).
Moreover, a refusal to allow access to a product
protected by copyright, where that product is indispensable for operating on a secondary market
was only abusive: ‘‘where the undertaking which
requested the licence does not intend to limit itself
to duplicating the goods or services already offered
on the secondary market by the owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new goods or services’’84 (emphasis added). Whether there were, in
fact, two markets here, or whether NDC would
83. [48].
84. [49].



produce new products was left to the national court
to determine.
In practice, the Court therefore summarised that
a refusal to licence would be abusive if:
(1) NDC intended to offer new regional sales
data products or services, not offered by
IMS and for which there is potential consumer demand;
(2) IMS’ refusal is not objectively justified; and
(3) IMS’ refusal reserved to IMS the data services market in question by eliminating all
competition therein.
It will be interesting to know what the national
court finds. The criteria are demanding and one
may wonder how ‘‘new’’ a product NDC is really
contemplating or the Court will require.
This remains therefore a hugely controversial
and difficult area, where it is only in exceptional
cases that compulsory licensing will be ordered.
The judgment may also put in doubt the reasoning
in some earlier Commission decisions. In other
words, it is clear that Magill was about a new
product: a comprehensive TV listings guide. It is
less clear that the port cases were about new products, unless one treats new frequencies or types of
transport as new products or services.
In any event, IP holders may be somewhat
pleased with the general respect for their rights,
albeit that the Court is still saying that it is possible
to override such rights in exceptional cases.

What is an agreement?
In the course of the year there have been two
judgments on what constitutes an agreement, following on from Volkswagen I last October.85 First,
in December 2003, the CFI annulled the Commission’s decision finding that Volkswagen’s calls to
its dealers to raise the prices of VW Passat sales
were unlawful.86 Then, in January 2004, the ECJ
upheld the CFI’s ruling in Bayer Adalat that the
Commission had not proved the existence of
an agreement between Bayer and its Spanish and
French wholesalers to prevent parallel imports into
the United Kingdom.87
Volkswagen II
The case was an appeal against the Commission’s
decision in 2001 to fine Volkswagen almost e31
million for ‘‘setting the price of the VW Passat on the
basis of exhortations to its German authorised dealers to grant limited discounts or no discounts at all

85. Case C–338/00, judgment of September 18, 2003.
86. Case T–208/01, judgment of December 3, 2003.
87. Joined Cases C–2/01 P and C–3/01 P, Bundesverband
der Arzneimittel-Importeure and Commission v Bayer,
judgment of January 6, 2004.
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to customers in selling the VW Passat’’88 (emphasis
added).
The issue was whether the Commission could
find that there was an unlawful agreement between
Volkswagen and its dealers, merely because they
had entered into distributorship agreements which
were then followed up by calls not to discount. The
Commission argued that, by entering into the
underlying distribution agreement, the dealers
had already agreed to follow the manufacturer’s
policy and had therefore agreed to follow such
‘‘exhortations’’ to raise prices. Volkswagen argued
that for an agreement to be caught by Art.81(1) EC it
is necessary to show a ‘‘concurrence of wills’’. One
could not infer from entering into a lawful distributorship agreement that a dealer had agreed to
accept later, unlawful contractual variations. In
order to prove an infringement here, the Commission had also to show that dealers had ‘‘acquiesced’’
in or accepted the exhortations in issue and, at least,
had also changed their conduct in relation to prices.
In short, Volkswagen argued that its actions were
unilateral and that the Commission had not shown
that the dealers acquiesced in Volkswagen’s exhortations not to discount.
The CFI agreed with Volkswagen and was critical of the Commission’s approach. There had been
other (Court) cases where dealers were found to
have accepted apparently unilateral conduct by a
manufacturer in the context of continuing relations
with dealers. However, the Court stressed that in
such cases the Commission has to establish the
acquiescence of other contractual partners, express
or implied, in the attitude adopted by the manufacturer. In previous cases it had done so. On the facts
here, the Commission had not shown that the
exhortations in issue were implemented in practice.89 Moreover, the Court stressed that it could not
be said that an unlawful contractual variation could
be accepted as having been accepted in advance
upon and by the signature of a lawful distribution
agreement.90
The Court also rejected the Commission’s interpretation of earlier case law, noting that the cases
concerned turned on distributors accepting conduct which was necessarily unlawful, not acquiescence in advance to an, as yet, unknown policy of
the manufacturer. Other cases had therefore involved a proven concurrence of wills.
Bayer Adalat
In January 2004 the ECJ confirmed the CFI’s judgment overturning the Commission’s Bayer Adalat
decision.91 The Commission and certain pharma-

88. Case T–208/01, judgment of December 3, 2003.
89. See [32]–[38].
90. [43]–[45].
91. Joined cases C–2/01P and C–3/01P, judgment of January 6, 2004.



ceutical importer associations had appealed. There
are three points of particular interest.
First, the way the parties addressed the underlying policy debate. Notably, the Commission argued that the CFI’s restrictive interpretation of what
constituted an agreement and its stricter requirement as to proof thereof called ‘‘into question the
policy pursued by the Commission in fighting
restrictions of competition based on hindrances to
parallel imports’’.92 Bayer, on the other hand, argued that the Commission was seeking to establish
‘‘hindrance to parallel imports’’ as ‘‘being in itself ’’
an infringement of (what is now) Art.81(1) EC93 and
to catch unilateral measures which could only be
challenged if carried out by a dominant company.
Secondly, the focus of the Court on the specific
issue as to whether an agreement to restrict competition had been entered into in the circumstances.
Importantly, the ECJ noted that in this case there
was ‘‘a simple refusal to sell and not a sale allegedly subject to certain conditions imposed on distributors’’.94
The Court then went on to distinguish any wider
Commission objective. The fact that Bayer’s unilateral policy of quotas and the national requirement
that wholesalers offer a full product range produced the same effect as an export ban, did not
mean that Bayer had imposed such a ban, nor that
Bayer and the wholesalers had entered into an
agreement not to export.95 Agreeing with Bayer, the
Court observed:
‘‘[t]o hold that an agreement prohibited by [what was
then] Article 85(1) of the Treaty may be established
simply on the basis of the expression of a unilateral
policy aimed at preventing parallel imports would
have the effect of confusing the scope of that provision
with that of Article 86 of the EC Treaty’’.96

Then, in terms entirely in line with the CFI in
Volkswagen, the ECJ went on:
‘‘The mere concomitant existence of an agreement
which is in itself neutral and a measure restricting
competition that has been imposed unilaterally does
not amount to an agreement prohibited by that provision. Thus, the mere fact that a measure adopted by
a manufacturer, which has the objective or effect of
restricting competition, falls within the context of
continuous business relations between the manufacturer and its wholesalers is not sufficient for a finding
that such an agreement exists’’.97

Thirdly, the ECJ distinguished Sandoz,98 which
appears to have been a key part of the Commission’s
approach here. The Court noted that, in Sandoz, an
agreement was found when Sandoz placed the
92. [65].
93. [69].
94. [86].
95. [88].
96. [101].
97. [141].
98. Case C-277/87, Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici v
Commission, [1990] ECR I-45.
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words ‘‘export prohibited’’ on invoices (i.e. demanded a particular line of conduct from dealers)
and dealers still paid the relevant invoices and kept
ordering. In other words, the manufacturer had
imposed an export ban which had been tacitly
accepted by the wholesalers.99 Here the Court emphasised that Bayer had not imposed an export ban
on its wholesalers and the wholesalers had not
manifested an intent not to export. On the contrary,
wholesalers had taken measures to circumvent
Bayer’s unilateral system in order to keep exporting.1
The theme of these judgments for competition
authorities and plaintiffs is clear: Prove the specific
agreement not to export by dealers and distributors,
not just the manufacturer’s desire to achieve that
objective.

Syfait—A.G. Opinion2
In October 2004, A.G. Jacobs delivered his Opinion
in an Art.234 EC reference case from the Greek
Competition Commission, where that Commission
asked the ECJ to clarify whether and in what circumstances a dominant pharmaceutical company
may refuse to meet orders from wholesalers in order
to limit parallel trade.3
The Greek Commission launched an investigation in November 2000, after various Greek associations of pharmaceutical wholesalers, including
Syfait, complained that Glaxosmithkline (‘‘GSK’’,
formerly Glaxowellcome) had stopped meeting all
of the wholesalers’ orders for certain products. GSK
claimed that wholesalers, by exporting a large proportion of their orders to other EU Member States
where prices were much higher, had caused shortages on the Greek market. GSK initially stated that it
would only supply hospitals and pharmacies, but
subsequently reinstated supplies to wholesalers in
limited quantities.
The Greek Commission considered that GSK
enjoyed a dominant position at least in one of the
products in question, ‘‘Lamictal’’ (an anti-epileptic
drug). On that basis, in August 2001, it granted
interim measures and ordered GSK’s Greek subsidiary to meet in full the orders from wholesalers,
limited to the supplies it received from the parent
company. However, supplies through GSK’s Greek
subsidiary were sufficient to satisfy the demand on
the Greek market, but not the wholesalers’ much
larger orders for parallel trade. Following hearings,
the Greek Commission decided in January 2003 to
99. [142].
1. [104], [123] and [142].
2. With thanks to Flavia Distefano and Elisabeth Arsenidou
for their assistance.
3. Case C–53/03, Syfait v Glaxosmithkline, opinion of
October 28, 2004; Press Release No.87/04, October 28,
2004.



suspend the case and refer various questions to the
ECJ.
The Greek Commission considered that unrestricted parallel trade could seriously undermine
the financial interests of pharmaceutical manufacturers, eroding their revenues and disrupting their
organisational arrangements in Member States
where products are exported. It also noted that
parallel trade mainly benefited wholesalers rather
than consumers and that, since Member States are
the effective purchasers of most pharmaceutical
products, through health schemes, they can lower
national prices, if they want to pay less.
The Greek Commission asked the Court whether
and on which conditions the protection of legitimate commercial interests can justify a restriction
of supply by a dominant pharmaceutical company
in order to limit parallel imports.
A.G. Jacobs noted that, based on the case law of
the Court, a refusal to supply by a dominant undertaking is an abuse only in exceptional circumstances, after close scrutiny of the specific factual
and economic context of each case shows serious
harm to competition.
He considered that a refusal to supply in order to
limit parallel trade does not amount per se to an
abuse within the meaning of Art.82 EC, because a
dominant company is not obliged to meet orders
which are ‘‘out of the ordinary’’ and is justified in
defending its commercial interests.
In particular, as concerns the ‘‘highly specific’’
context of the European pharmaceutical industry,
he considered that a supply restriction in order to
limit parallel trade can be objectively justified, as a
reasonable and proportionate measure to protect
the producers’ legitimate commercial interests.
A.G. Jacobs stressed that his conclusions were
limited to the pharmaceutical market only and
were based on the following three considerations:
—

—

First, price differentials which create opportunities for parallel trade are the result of the
regulated nature of the European pharmaceutical market. Companies are justified in
attempting to limit parallel trade because
they are not seeking to entrench price differentials of their own making, but to avoid
the negative consequences which would
follow if very low prices in some Member
States were generalised across the Community. A requirement to meet all orders would,
in many cases, impose a disproportionate
burden, especially given the moral and legal
obligations incumbent on companies to
maintain supplies in all Member States.
Secondly, a requirement to supply would
harm the incentive for dominant companies
to innovate and invest in R&D, given the low
returns which they could expect during the
period of its patent protection.
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—

Thirdly, such parallel trade mainly benefited wholesalers rather than purchasers.

A.G. Jacobs also considered whether the Greek
Commission could be considered as a ‘‘judicial
body’’ under Art.234 EC, despite the fact that only
two out of its nine members are lawyers,4 so that a
reference to the ECJ was admissible.
He concluded that the Commission could be
considered as a ‘‘judicial body’’, because an authority charged with complex technical issues, such as
competition law, is expected to have a lower proportion of members with pure legal background. He
also noted that this is in line with Regulation 1/
2003. A generous approach towards references
by national competition authorities would provide
an additional safeguard for the uniformity of Community law.
Clearly an important opinion! It will be interesting to see what the Court now rules.
Box 4
— Cartel cases
* Greek Ferries:
 Can the Commission ask for increased
fines for appeals of the facts?
* Cement
 Company acquired after infringement
not part of relevant turnover for fine.
* Graphite Electrodes
 Very detailed review by CFI of the way
the Commission applied the fining
guidelines
 Fine increases may be made in some
cases (2 per cent here) (Time for a new
rule?)
 What does a company have to give in
response to a request for information?
Even notes of cartel meetings?!
* Seamless steel tubes
 Voluntary restraint not legal protection,
just politics
 Fine increase discussed, but decrease in
circumstances
* German banks
 Weak evidence
 Beware the fax!
* Dutch electro-technical Fittings
wholesalers
 Unilateral collective exclusive dealing
agreement

Cartel cases
Greek Ferries
In December 2003, the CFI generally upheld the
Commission’s decision in the Greek Ferries cartel

4. The Court has already dealt in the past with references
from national competition authorities, e.g. it admitted a
reference by the Spanish Tribunal for the Defence of
Competition in Case C–67/91, Asociación Española de
Banca Privada and Others [1992] E.C.R. I-4785.



cases, while reducing the fines on two companies.5
It may be recalled that these cases involved
alleged price-fixing and market-sharing between
Italy and Greece. The markets concerned were small
and there was argument about whether governmental involvement in the sector should be treated
as sufficient to suggest that the companies had been
instructed or otherwise pressured to enter into such
agreements. The Commission rejected such defence claims, but reduced fines in part because it
accepted that there may have been some uncertainty on the issue. As a result of these factors, the
Commission treated a ‘‘very serious’’ infringement
as a ‘‘serious’’ one and tailored the fines to the small
market size.
The companies concerned still appealed. Several points are of interest.
First, the CFI found that one company, Ventouris, had been fined too much because the Commission had treated the infringement as a single
continuous one whereas, in fact, the infringement
should have been divided into two, one related to
passenger services and another related to cargo
services. Since Ventouris had only been involved
in the cargo infringement, which only concerned a
smaller market on specific routes and which was
about one quarter of the passenger services market, its fine was reduced from e1.01 million to
e252,000.6 The fine on another company, Adriatica
di Navigazione, was similarly reduced from
e980,000 to e245,000.
Secondly, the companies contested the lawfulness of the Commission’s investigation, insofar as
the Commission had carried out a ‘‘dawn raid’’ on
premises believed to belong to Minoan Lines, but
which were in fact those of Minoan’s agent, a
company called the European Trust Agency
(‘‘ETA’’). After a detailed review, the Court found
that the Commission could validly investigate such
third party premises since the Commission was
entitled to treat them as the premises of Minoan.
On the facts, the Court noted that ETA had been
given the power to represent Minoan in the investigation and the premises were the real centre of
Minoan’s activities. The Court also found that ETA
was operating as a single economic unit with Minoan.
Thirdly, insofar as on appeal some companies
contested findings of fact related to the infringement, the Commission asked the CFI to remove the
20 per cent reduction of fines which had been
granted in the Commission’s proceedings for not
contesting the facts and to increase the fines accordingly. The Court rejected this. The Court’s
view, echoing that taken in the Stora case, was
that the companies could not be prevented from
5. Cases T–56, T–59, T–61, T–65 and T–66/99, judgments
of December 11, 2003.
6. Case T–59/99, Ventouris v Commission at [214]–[222].
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Wholesalers of electro-technical fittings
In December 2004, the CFI dismissed two applications for annulment of the Commission’s decision
in the Dutch electro-technical wholesalers fittings
cartel case.8
It may be recalled that CEF Holdings Ltd, a UK
wholesale distributor for electro-technical fittings,
faced difficulties entering the Dutch market and
lodged a complaint with the Commission. After a
somewhat protracted investigation, in October
1999 the Commission found that FEG, a Dutch association of wholesalers of electro-technical fittings,
had infringed Art.81(1) EC by entering into a collective exclusive dealing arrangement intended to
prevent supplies to non-members of the FEG. This
arrangement had included an agreement with NAVEG, a Dutch association of ‘‘Exclusive (supplier)
Representatives’’ in the electro-technical sector and
concerted practices with suppliers not represented
in NAVEG. Moreover, the Commission found that
FEG had restricted the freedom of its members to
determine selling prices individually. One company,
Technische Unie (‘‘TU’’) which was one of FEG’s
members, was also accused of taking active part in
these infringements. The Commission imposed a
fine of e4.4 million on FEG and e2.15 million on TU.
In January 2000, both TU and FEG appealed. The
CFI upheld the Commission’s finding that FEG had
entered into a collective exclusive dealing arrangement aimed at preventing supplies to non-members
of the FEG.
The infringement comprised (i) a gentlemen’s
agreement between FEG and NAVEG by which
NAVEG undertook that it would advise its members not to sell electro-technical fittings to wholesalers not belonging to the FEG; and (ii) concerted
practices whereby the FEG and its members sought
to extend that agreement to certain suppliers not
belonging to NAVEG. The exclusive dealing arrangement, however, was not reciprocal, meaning
that FEG members were, in principle, free to purchase products from firms which were not party to
the agreement.

On appeal, FEG argued that the ‘‘unilateral’’
collective exclusive dealing arrangement was ‘‘devoid of purpose’’ and that NAVEG members had no
interest in concluding such an arrangement. However, the Court rejected this argument, pointing out
that FEG had 96 per cent of the Dutch wholesale
market for electro-technical fittings and still some
50 per cent if a broader market definition were
taken, including direct distribution from suppliers
to retailers. In short, FEG had purchasing power
which could not be disregarded by NAVEG members.
As regards the concerted practices aimed at extending the exclusive dealing arrangement to
undertakings not belonging to NAVEG, FEG denied
that they could be attributed to it as an association,
arguing that they should be attributed to its members. The Court rejected this as well, noting that the
respective actions concerned the same object,
shared the same beneficiaries and were implemented by the members and certain executives of the
FEG. As a result, they should be deemed attributable to that association.
Finally, the applicants argued that the administrative procedure had been excessive in duration.
Eight and a half years had passed from the complaint until the Commission eventually adopted its
decision in 1999. It was argued that this was not a
reasonable period for proceedings which are likely
to lead to penalties.
However, the CFI rejected this also. Quoting A.G.
Mischo in the PVC II case,9 the CFI considered that
it was necessary in considering the reasonableness
of such an extended procedure to make a distinction between the investigative phase prior to the
Statement of Objections and the rest of the administrative procedure.
In this context, the Court drew an analogy between
criminal and competition law observing that, in
criminal matters, the reasonableness of the time for
a procedure referred to in Art.6(1) of the European
Human Rights Convention ran from the time when
a person is charged. Similarly, the CFI considered
that the fact that a procedure was long up to the
Statement of Objections, was not in itself capable of
affecting the rights of defence.
Here the administrative procedure after the
Statement of Objections had taken more than 39
months. The reasonableness of this had to be assessed by reference to the specific circumstances of
the case. In this case, the Court concluded that the
16 months that had elapsed between the Statement
of Objections and the Hearing of the parties were
not excessive. However, the 23 months between the
Hearing and the final decision exceeded the period
which, in the normal course of events, would be
needed for adoption of the decision. Since the

7. Case T–65/99, Strintzis Lines v Commission, at [27]–[30].
8. Joined Cases T–5/00 and T–6/00, judgment of the Court
of December 16, 2003.

9. Opinion in Case C–250/99, P Limburgse Vinyl
Maatschappij.

exercising their appeal remedies normally under
the Treaty. In particular, a company could not be
criticised for disagreeing with the manner in which
the Commission obtained documents and could
also contest the manner in which the Commission
appraised those documents as evidence of a cartel.7
(This issue has come up also in Graphite Electrodes, described below.)
Finally, on the substance, the CFI predictably
upheld the Commission’s approach on governmental action. It is a difficult defence plea to
make out, since the Court insists on clear evidence
that conduct was required by governmental action.
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Commission had already reduced the fines in the
case by e100,000 on both FEG and TV to deal with
this, the appeal was rejected.
The CFI considered that the uncertainty and
adverse effects on reputation involved in such
proceedings were just inherent in Regulation 17
procedures.
With respect, this is a somewhat harsh and
narrow approach. Practically, one can understand
that procedures with new issues and multiple
defendants can take time, but five years between
complaint and Statement of Objections is not adequate, either for the Commission (with staff mobility every five years) or the parties. One may also
question whether this issue is just about the rights
of the defence. Should not this be a question of good
administration, a principle which might sensibly
be used to promote quicker procedures?
Cement
In January 2004, the ECJ gave judgment on the
appeals brought by six companies from the CFI
judgments in the cement cartel case.10
In November 1994, the Commission had imposed fines, totalling e248 million on companies
and a trade association which had been involved in
various anti-competitive practices on the grey and
white cement markets. The Commission’s long and
detailed decision found, amongst other practices:
agreements on non-transshipment between EU countries, specific agreements on market-sharing, and
collective action to prevent exports of Greek cement
to Italy, the United Kingdom and other countries.
In 2000, the CFI reduced the amount of the fines
imposed by e140 million.11 The Court found that
(i) the Commission had not adequately proved
participation by some companies in the cartel;
(ii) some of these had participated for shorter periods of time than claimed by the Commission; and
(iii) two of the companies had been deprived of
evidence which might have aided their defence.
In consequence their fines were annulled. In addition, the CFI found that the Statement of Objections had not indicated an intention to fine the trade
association, so its fine was annulled.
The ECJ largely upheld the CFI’s judgment.
First, in the case of Ciments français, the ECJ
found that turnover of a Belgian subsidiary had
been incorrectly included in calculating the applicable fine. This subsidiary had not come under the
control of Ciments français until October 1990, i.e.
after the infringement ended. The fine on Ciments
français was reduced by just under e4 million to
e9.6 million accordingly.12
10. Joined Cases C–204/00 and others, Aalborg Portland,
judgment of January 7, 2004. With thanks to Cormac O’Daly
for his assistance.
11. Joined Cases T–25/95, etc. Cimentières CBR v Commission [2000] E.C.R. II-491. See [2001] I.C.C.L.R. 13–15.
12. [381] to [385].



Secondly, the ECJ confirmed the correctness
of the CFI’s approach on a number of procedural
issues. Notably:
—

—

—

—

—

The CFI had been correct not to annul the
decision despite the Commission’s acknowledgment that it had denied access to three
quarters of the documents in its file.
Before any such annulment it had to be
shown that the lack of sufficient access to
the file prevented access to documents
which were likely to be of use in the companies’ defence.13
By ordering measures of organisation, allowing the parties to review the file to see
if there were material documents, which
they could have used in their defence, the
CFI had also not attempted to replace the
Commission in its investigative role. It had
merely carried out a provisional examination of the evidence to assess whether there
had been an infringement of the rights of the
defence.14
Furthermore, to justify a finding of a material error, the CFI had been correct to hold
that it was necessary to determine an ‘‘objective link’’ between the documents withheld by the Commission and an objection
contained in the decision.15
The CFI was also correct in its view that the
test for when lack of access to a document
might justify annulment of the decision was
whether, following disclosure, there would
have been even a small chance of the outcome of the administrative procedure being
altered.16

One senses that the ECJ, like the CFI, was not
supportive of technical procedural challenges to
this enormous decision in an enormous case.
Thirdly, the ECJ also found that an interested
party is not entitled to be informed by the Commission if the latter drops certain objections (here in
relation to certain conduct on the Italian market).17
It is only necessary to inform a would-be addressee
of such a decision if there would be a material
alteration in the evidence relied on in a decision,
or if new facts would be taken into account.18
Fourthly, the CFI was correct to reject Irish
Cement’s argument that it had a right to cross
examine the authors of certain documents. The
procedure before the Commission is purely administrative and there is no requirement that cross
examination be permitted.19
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

[101].
[102] to [106].
[126] to [129].
[131].
[188] to [196].
[192].
[200].
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Graphite Electrodes
In April 2004, the CFI issued its judgment in various appeals against the Commission’s Graphite
Electrodes decision.20 It may be recalled that this
decision involved a worldwide price-fixing and
market-sharing cartel for electric arc furnaces,
which are mainly used to make steel.21 Fines totalling some e220 million were imposed. Eight European, American and Japanese firms were involved.
There were parallel proceedings in the United
States and Canada.
There were seven appeals, leading to significant
reductions of fines, essentially on the basis that the
Commission has misapplied its own fining guidelines. In one case, the CFI also increased a fine, in
the sense that it modified the reduction in fine
which the Commission had given the company.
Overall, the fines on the seven companies concerned were reduced from e207.2 million to
e152.8 million.
The case is interesting for a number of points.
First, although the Court stated that the Commission has a large measure of discretion in fining, it
stressed that the Commission must apply its own
fining guidelines strictly. In particular, there should
be respect for the principles of proportionality and
equal treatment as between the cartel offenders.
Interestingly, in this case the Court was also willing
to look closely at the evidence which the Commission relied on for each element of the guidelines, in
order to see if there were ‘‘manifest errors’’ in their
application.
The result is that the CFI checked the Commission’s positions in detail and, in several ways, disagreed with the Commission’s findings, leading
to significant reductions in almost all of the fines
imposed. Thus, the largest fine was reduced from
e80.2 million to e69.1 million and others were
simply halved.22 Amongst other things, the Court
reviewed (and corrected) whether firms had been
placed in the right ‘‘size categories’’ for the starting
amount of fines; the amount of multiplier applied to
a firm for deterrence; and the importance of the
cooperation of companies to the Commission’s
case.
Secondly, the Court rejected the argument that
fines and damages paid for the infringement outside the EEA should be taken into account in
assessing EU fines. The Court held that such sanctions penalised infringements with impacts on
different markets. However, the Court confirmed
that fines or damages paid for infringements inside
the EU are to be taken into account, since they apply
to the same territory.23 The Court also found that it
was not unlawful for the Commission to consider
20. Cases T–236/01 and others, Tokai Carbon v Commission, judgment of April 29, 2004.
21. [2002] I.C.C.L.R. 24.
22. [458].
23. [132]–[134], [138], [148] and [348].



worldwide turnover derived from sales of the relevant product in order to evaluate the economic
capacity of the cartel members to harm competition
in the EEA.24
Thirdly, the Court found that a company which
cooperates through oral communications should
be given credit for that cooperation under the leniency programme.25 On the facts, UCAR had given
information orally, which was later confirmed in
written statements, but the Commission had not
given UCAR credit for the oral information. The CFI
said that was wrong because the information had
been useful to the Commission’s investigation.
Fourthly, the Court again had to deal with requests by the Commission to increase fines imposed where firms had challenged the findings of
fact in the case on appeal, while receiving a reduction in the fine imposed for not contesting the
facts.26 The Commission asked for increases of at
least 10 per cent.
The Court’s approach here was more nuanced
than in Greek Ferries. The Court stated:
—

—

—

—

—

If a firm has expressly, clearly and specifically acknowledged the facts, it is estopped,
in principle, from disputing them on appeal.27
If a firm does not expressly acknowledge
facts, the Commission must prove them and
a company can put forward any plea in
defence which it deems appropriate.
If the Commission’s case is not clear and the
firm concerned considers that the facts have
been misinterpreted, it can raise such an
issue on appeal. That was the case here since
the Commission had relied on general conduct and no-contest statements, rather than
specifics.
However, if a company does so, it may lose
the 10 per cent reduction for co-operation or
part of it, where the company has obliged the
Commission to put forward further evidence, or to draft a defence on such an issue.
A company is also entitled to put ‘‘a fresh
legal complexion’’ on documentary evidence
previously submitted in the procedure.28

On the facts, this led to an increase of one fine by
2 per cent29 (i.e. a reduction for non-contestation of
the facts from 10 per cent to 8 per cent).
This has become undesirably complex. Perhaps
it is inevitable because the fines are so high and
their level turns on precise facts. However, one
would think that a solution would be to give companies a ‘‘draft preliminary findings of fact’’
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

[200].
[430]–[433].
[98] and [272].
[108]–[109].
[288].
[112]–[113]; [286]–[288] and [418].
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document, before the formal Statement of Objections, so that they can check it and co-operate with
the Commission in making sure that it has the facts
right. At the moment, companies are faced with the
Statement of Objections and know that if they
‘‘contest’’ it that may be perceived as a ground for
denying them a 10 per cent reduction in fines. As a
result, companies may not clarify particular points,
which can lead to disputes later, when the companies realise that fines are much higher as a result.
Fifthly, the Court upheld appeals that companies should be given credit for providing answers to
Commission requests for information, which went
further than legally permitted. In other words, the
CFI found that the Commission had asked companies not only purely factual questions and for
existing documents, but also to describe what happened at meetings and for the results/conclusions
and for protocols and other material disclosing the
contents of meetings which the Commission suspected involved infringements.
Applying Orkem and MannesmannröhrenWerke,30 the Court held that such material did not
have to be provided, since it involved admissions of
the infringements concerned. By providing that
information, the companies were therefore not acting pursuant to a legal obligation and were entitled
to credit for their voluntary waiver of their defence
rights.31 The result is that the Commission had to
give companies ‘‘co-operation credit’’ for answering requests for information which go beyond what
the Commission was legally entitled to ask for. The
Court also held that a company is not required to tell
the Commission facts which will be used to increase its fine (i.e. here that it had warned another
company of an investigation32). The Commission is
appealing these points.
Finally, the Court confirmed that the Commission is not obliged to give a reduction for the
financial difficulties facing the cartel participants
(although it may choose to do so in its discretion,
where appropriate). It is argued that many cartels
arise because a sector is in difficulty and therefore
such an obligation would require the Commission
to give such a reduction in most cases.
Seamless Steel Tubes
In July 2004, the CFI gave judgment on appeals to
the Seamless Steel Tubes decision.33
The Commission had found a market-sharing
agreement between European and Japanese producers of seamless carbon-steel pipes and tubes,

so-called ‘‘Oil Country Tubular Goods’’ (‘‘OCTG’’)
and ‘‘Line Pipes’’ used to transport oil and gas. This
was called the ‘‘Europe-Japan Club’’. The Commission had fined the eight companies, with amounts
totalling e99 million. Seven of the eight brought
annulment actions which the CFI largely rejected.
However, the fines were reduced by e13 million on
two grounds.
First, it may be recalled that the Commission had
taken into account the existence of voluntary export restraints and similar measures concluded
between the Commission and Japan between 1972
and 1990 to conclude that fines should only be
imposed from the beginning of 1990 onwards.34
The parties claimed that the voluntary restraints
continued until the end of 1990. Since the Commission was for some reason unable to produce
evidence to the contrary from its archives, the CFI
upheld the position of the companies.
In addition, in the case of the Japanese companies, the Commission was found not to have adequately proved that the infringement lasted beyond
July 1, 1994, although it had claimed that the
infringement ceased at the beginning of 1995. As a
result, the period in respect of which the fine was
calculated for the Japanese companies was reduced
from five to three and a half years and the relevant
period for the European companies was reduced by
one year.
It should be noted also that the Commission did
not treat the voluntary restraints as obliging it to
reduce the fines concerned, particularly because
the old 1972 Commission Notice on Imports from
Japan stated that no comfort could be drawn from
voluntary restraint agreements as regards the application of competition law. Rather, the reductions were viewed as political concessions.35
Secondly, the CFI reduced the Japanese companies’ fines for breach of the principle of equal
treatment. The European companies had committed an additional, separate infringement of Art.81
EC, but the Commission had not taken account of
this in determining the amount of their fines.36 In
this respect, different situations had been treated
identically. The CFI stated that the logical way to
remedy this would have been to increase the fines
payable by the European companies.37 However,
the Commission had not argued this point in its
defence and had only raised it at the hearing.38
Given that the European companies had therefore
been unable to give their views on a possible increase in their fines, the CFI decided that it would

30. Case 374/87, Orkem v Commission [1989] E.C.R.
3283; Case T–112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2001] E.C.R. II-729.
31. [401]–[409] and [412].
32. [412].
33. Cases T–44/00, T–48/00, T–50/00 and Joined Cases
T–67/00, T–68/00, T–71/00 and T–78/00, judgment of July
8, 2004. With thanks to Cormac O’Daly for his assistance.

34. [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 61.
35. See the Joined Cases judgment at [340]–[528] and
[582]–[587].
36. [567] to [571].
37. [576].
38. [578].
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be more appropriate to reduce the fines imposed on
the Japanese companies.39
German Banks–Eurozone
In October 2004, the CFI annulled the Commission’s decision concerning the alleged involvement of German banks in an agreement to fix the
way of charging and the actual charge for converting currency into Euros in the transitional period
before the Euro was introduced.40
The Commission had found such an agreement
on the basis of two accounts of a meeting in 1997
between German banks, corroborated in its view by
statements made at the Oral Hearing in the case and
the banks’ actual behaviour.
The Commission considered that there was (at
least some) consensus that a percentage commission be used for such exchange and on a target
commission of about 3 per cent (to achieve 90 per
cent recovery of the income which banks made
previously on currency exchange through currency
buying and selling rate differentials).
The banks put forward alternative arguments.
Notably, that there had been no actual agreement.
In fact, the agreed communication to the German
Bundesbank after the relevant meeting had stated
that each bank would decide for itself the form to be
taken by its future charging structure.
On the facts, the Court found for the applicant.
All this occurred by way of a ruling on judgment in
default since, owing to a faxing error, the Commission had not submitted its Defence in time. What
the Court did therefore was to assess the applicant’s
arguments against those in the Commission’s decision, but without the Defence. In such circumstances the Court did not consider the Commission’s
decision to be founded on sufficiently cogent evidence on the way charges were to be made or their
amount.41

sidered that there was not adequate evidence of
other findings: that JCB fixed discounts or resale
prices of its distributors in the United Kingdom and
France; that JBC imposed service support fees on its
UK distributors selling to other Member States, or
that JCB withdrew trading support from agents in
the United Kingdom in the case of sales outside the
territory.
In April 2004, the ECJ dismissed British Sugar’s
appeal against the CFI’s judgment upholding the
Commission’s British industrial and retail sugar
decision.44 The Court upheld the CFI’s assessment
of effect on trade between Member States and
rejected other challenges to the CFI’s review of the
fines imposed.45
In September 2004, the CFI also ruled that the
International Olympic Committee’s anti-doping
regulations were not subject to EC Competition
law, being purely sporting rules which do not
pursue any economic objective.46

In Pt 2, to be published in Issue 3, the author
will outline:








Recent Commission cartel, co-operation and
distribution cases, in areas such as national
recycling schemes, airline alliances, financial services, and the distribution of Pokémon stickers.
Various new proposed ‘‘commitment decisions’’ for the German Bundesliga, CocaCola’s rebate system and Repsol’s service
stations in Spain.
The Commission’s Art.82 EC decision in
Microsoft.
Policy issues, such as a possible extension
of in-house privilege.
The Commission’s recent drive to promote
competition in the liberal profession with a
decision involving Belgian Architects.

Other
In January 2004, the CFI reduced the fine imposed
by the Commission on JCB from e39.6 million to
e30 million.42 It will be recalled that JCB produces
construction site, earth moving and agricultural
machinery/equipment.43 The Court upheld two
out of the five elements of the infringement which
the Commission had found. Thus, the Court upheld
Commission findings of restrictions on passive sales
by JCB’s distributors and restrictions on sources of
supply on some dealers. However, the Court con39. [579].
40. Case T–56/02 Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank v
Commission, judgment of October 14, 2004. The other
cases are T–44/02, T–54/02, T–60/02 and T–61/02.
41. For related previous proceedings see [2004] I.C.C.L.R.
59 and [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 62.
42. Case T–67/01, judgment of January 13, 2004.
43. See [2002] I.C.C.L.R. 63.



44. See [1999] I.C.C.L.R. 11.
45. Case C–359/01P, judgment of April 29, 2004.
46. Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission; Press Release No.71/2004, judgment of September 30, 2004.
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